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Recall tasks render 2 distinct sources of information available: the recalled content
and the experienced ease or difficulty with which it can be brought to mind. Because
retrieving many pieces of information is more difficult than retrieving only a few,
reliance on accessible content and subjective accessibility experiences leads to oppo-
site judgmental outcomes. People are likely to base judgments on accessibility
experiences when they adopt a heuristic processing strategy and the informational
value ofthe experience is not called into question. When the experience is considered
nondiagnostic, or when a systematic processing strategy is adopted, people rely on
accessible content. Implicationsfor the operation ofthe availability heuristic and the
emergence ofknowledge accessibility effects are discussed.
Judgment researchers have long been fascinated by
how minor events may temporarily influence the acces-
sibility of information in memory, which, in turn, may
result in pronounced differences in judgment and be-
havior. In conceptualizing the role of accessible infor-
mation, researchers have emphasized two different as-
pects. On the one hand, several related lines of research
focused on what comes to mind, that is, the content that
is rendered accessible (see Higgins, 1989, 1996;
Schwarz, 1995; Wyer & Srull, 1989). Some of this
research showed that we interpret ambiguous informa-
tion in terms of the applicable concepts that are most
accessible at the time (e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones,
1977). Other research demonstrated that we rarely re-
trieve all information that may bear on an issue but base
ourjudgments on the subset ofrelevant information that
is most accessible in memory (e.g., Bodenhausen &
Wyer, 1987). In contrast to this emphasis on accessible
content, other lines of research focused on how easily
something comes to mind, that is, the subjective expe-
rience of ease or difficulty of recall. Highlighting the
role of subjective accessibility experiences, Tversky
and Kahneman's (1973) availability heuristic holds that
we form judgments of frequency, likelihood, and typi-
cality on the basis of the ease with which exemplars can
be brought to mind. Subsequent lines of research ex-
plored the role of ease of retrieval in metacognitive
judgments (see Benjamin & Bjork, 1996; Jacoby &
Kelley, 1987; Kelley & Jacoby, 1996), including feel-
ings of knowing (e.g., Koriat, 1993), confidence in the
accuracy of one's knowledge (e.g., Kelley & Lindsay,
1993), orjudgments of memory (e.g., Jacoby & White-
house, 1989). In most cases, research into accessibility
phenomena has focused either on the role of accessible
declarative information or on the role of subjective
accessibility experiences.
In this article I extend this research by addressing the
interplay of accessible declarative information and sub-
jective accessibility experiences, focusing on the opera-
tion of the availability heuristic and the emergence of
knowledge accessibility effects in social judgment. In
the first section I summarize key theoretical assump-
tions and highlight the fact that many of the classic
experiments are inherently ambiguous, because the ob-
tained effects may reflect differences in what comes to
mind as well as differences in how easily it comes to
mind. In the subsequent sections I review research that
disentangles the distinct influences of accessible con-
tent and accessibility experiences and identifies condi-
tions under which people are likely to draw on accessi-
ble content versus subjective accessibility experiences
in forming ajudgment. In the final section I address the
theoretical implications of this research for theorizing
in social and cognitive psychology.
The Different Faces of Accessibility:
Content and Experience
Psychologists' differential emphasis on accessible
content and subjective accessibility experiences is most
clearly exemplified in Tversky and Kahneman's (1973)
availability heuristic on the one hand and social cogni-
tion research into knowledge accessibility effects in
social judgment on the other hand. I address both in
turn.
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Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) availability heuris-
tic postulated a metacognitive judgment process: Indi-
viduals are assumed to estimate the frequency of an
event, or the likelihood of its occurrence, "by the ease
with which instances or associations come to mind" (p.
208). Presumably, they monitor their cognitive proc-
esses and infer that a given class of events is frequent
when relevant exemplars are easy to bring to mind but
rare when exemplars are difficult to bring to mind.
Although this heuristic has stimulated an enormous
amount of research (see Sherman & Corty, 1984;
Strack, 1985; Taylor, 1982), the classic studies on the
issue do not allow strong conclusions about the under-
lying process. For example, in one of the better known
experiments, Tversky and Kahneman (1973, Experi-
ment 3) observed that participants overestimated the
number of words that begin with the letter r but under-
estimated the number of words that have r as the third
letter. This finding presumably reflects the fact that
words that begin with a certain letter can be brought to
mind more easily than words that have a certain letter
in the third position. More important, however, this
differential ease of recall may influence participants'
frequency estimates in two different ways. On the one
hand, participants may use the subjective experience of
ease or difficulty of recall as a basis of judgment, as
suggested by Tversky and Kahneman's (1973) descrip-
tion of the availability heuristic. If so, they would
estimate a higher frequency if the recall task was expe-
rienced as easy rather than difficult. On the other hand,
they may recall as many words of each type as possible
within the time allotted to them and may base their
judgment on the recalled sample of words. If it was
easier to recall words that begin with a certain letter,
these words would be overrepresented in the recalled
sample, again resulting in an estimate of higher fre-
quency. Note, however, that in the latter case, the
estimate would be based on recalled content rather than
on the subjective experience of ease of recall. In a
related study, Gabrielcik and Fazio (1984) observed
that exposing participants to subliminally presented
words containing the letter t increased participants'
estimates of the frequency of t words. Again, this find-
ing may indicate either that participants could generate
more words including a t if primed or that they relied
on the ease with which relevant exemplars could be
called to mind.
Similar ambiguities apply to other experimental pro-
cedures. In another well-known Tversky and Kahneman
study (1973, Experiment 8), participants were read two
lists of names, one presenting 19 famous men and 20 less
famous women and the other presenting 19 famous
women and 20 less famous men. When asked, partici-
pants reported that there were more men than women in
the first list but more women than men in the second list,
even though the opposite was the case (by a difference
of one). Again, the famous names were presumably
easier to recall than the nonfamous ones, resulting in an
overestimate. In fact, participants were able to recall
about 50% more of the famous than the ni lfamous
names. This difference in actual recall again highlights
the ambiguity underlying most tests of the availability
heuristic: Are participants' judgments indeed based on
the phenomenal experience of ease or difficulty of
recall, as Tversky and Kahneman's description of the
availability heuristic suggests? Or are their judgments
based on the content of recall, with famous names being
overrepresented in the recalled sample?
As these examples illustrate, manipulations intended
to increase the subjective experience of ease of recall
are also likely to affect the amount of recall. In most
real-world situations, these two factors are naturally
confounded. Unfortunately, this confound renders it
difficult to determine whether the obtained estimates of
frequency, likelihood, or typicality are based on a meta-
cognitive strategy that draws on individuals' recall
experiences or on a biased sample of recalled informa-
tion. As Taylor (1982) noted, the latter possibility
would render the availability heuristic rather triv-
ial-after all, "one's judgments are always based on
what comes to mind" (p. 199, italics added). In fact,
some textbooks have chosen the latter interpretation in
introducing the availability heuristic, as a quote from
Medin and Ross (1997) illustrates:
The availability heuristic refers to a tendency to form
a judgment on the basis of what is readily brought to
mind. For example, a person who is asked whether
there are more English words that begin with the letter
t or the letter k might try to think of words that begin
with each of these letters. Because a person can prob-
ably think of more words beginning with t, he or she
would (correctly) conclude that t is more frequent than
k as the first letter of English words. (p. 522)
Knowledge Accessibility Effects in
Social Judgment
Similar ambiguities apply to the social judgment
literature. This literature has traced many context ef-
fects in social judgment to differences in information
accessibility (see Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987; Higgins,
1989, 1996; Martin & Clark, 1990; Schwarz, 1995).
The underlying assumptions are somewhat different,
depending on whether thejudgment pertains to aknown
target, about which information is recalled from mem-
ory, or to a new target, about which information is
acquired at that time.
When asked to form a judgment about a known
target, individuals recall relevant information from
memory. However, they do not recall all information
that may be relevant to the target but truncate the search
process as soon as enough information has come to
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mind to form a judgment with sufficient subjective
certainty. As a result, the judgment is dominated by the
information that is most accessible at the time. For
example, Schwarz, Strack, and Mai (1991) asked re-
spondents to report their general life satisfaction and
their marital satisfaction and varied the order in which
the questions were presented. When the general life
satisfaction question preceded the marital satisfaction
question, the reports correlated r = .32. When the mari-
tal satisfaction question was presented first, however,
this correlation increased to r = .67. Presumably, an-
swering the marital satisfaction question first rendered
information about one's marriage highly accessible and
this, rather than other, information was subsequently
used in evaluating one's life as a whole (see Schwarz
& Bless, 1992). Accordingly, unhappily married indi-
viduals reported lower life satisfaction when the marital
satisfaction question was asked first, whereas happily
married individuals reported higher life satisfaction
under this condition. It remains unclear, however, if
effects of this type are solely based on the content that
comes to mind. Instead, it is conceivable that the ease
with which previously activated content comes to mind
may affect the judgment in its own right, either by
suggesting that this information is particularly relevant
(or else, why would it pop to mind?) or by suggesting
that there are many similar features, as implied by the
availability heuristic. Hence, the underlying processes
may involve a metacognitive component that draws on
subjective accessibility experiences.
Similarly, when individuals acquire new information,
they are likely to interpret it in terms of the applicable
concept that is most accessible at that time. Given that
many pieces of information are inherently ambiguous,
which concept is brought to bear on them is of crucial
importance. For example, Higgins et al. (1977) described
a target person with ambiguous behaviors, such as
Once Donald made up his mind to do something it was
as good as done, no matter how long it might take or
how difficult the going might be. Only rarely did he
change his mind, even when it might well have been
better if he had.
As expected, their participants inferred from these be-
haviors either that Donald was stubborn, a negative
trait, or that he was persistent, a positive trait, depending
on which trait concept had been rendered accessible by
a preceding task. Again, it is conceivable that the ap-
parent ease with which a trait concept came to mind
while reading the behavioral description contributed to
the obtained effect.
Summary
In sum, different bodies of literature have traced
accessibility effects either to what comes to mind or to
how easily it comes to mind. Unfortunately, most ma-
nipulations that influence what comes to mind are also
likely to influence how easily it comes to mind, render-
ing it difficult to determine the underlying processes. In
this article I address this ambiguity. In the next section
I review research that demonstrates that subjective ac-
cessibility experiences can serve as a source of infor-
mation in their own right, consistent with the metacog-
nitive proposal entailed in Tversky and Kahneman's
(1973) availability heuristic. In the subsequent sections
I review research that has created conditions under
which reliance on accessible content leads to different
judgmental outcomes than reliance on accessibility ex-
periences, thus providing a methodological tool for
determining the variables that govern the use of these
different sources of information.
Accessibility Experiences as a
Source of Information
If subjective experiences of ease or difficulty of
recall serve as a source ofinformation in theirown right,
their impact should vary as a function of the perceived
diagnosticity of the experience, as has been observed
for other types of experiential information, such as
moods (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983) or arousal (e.g.,
Zillman, 1978; see also Schwarz & Clore, 1996). Ac-
cording to the availability heuristic, we should infer, for
example, that there are many words that begin with the
letter t if we find it easy to bring relevant examples to
mind. This inference is based on the generally correct
assumption that it is easier to recall exemplars of a
frequent than an infrequent category. Suppose, how-
ever, that you have reason to assume that a temporary
situational factor renders t words more accessible than
might otherwise be the case. If so, the experienced ease
of recall may reflect this irrelevant influence rather than
the actual frequency of t words. Hence, you may dis-
count the subjective experience as a relevant source of
information. Conversely, if you had reason to assume
that a temporary situational factor inhibits the recall of
t words, but you find them easy to bring to mind
nevertheless, the experienced ease of recall should seem
particularly diagnostic. The emergence of such dis-
counting and augmentation effects (Kelley, 1972)
would provide compelling evidence for the role of
accessibility experiences in frequency judgments.
The Diagnosticity of Accessibility
Experiences: Frequency Judgments
To test these predictions, Wanke, Schwarz, and
Bless (1995) conducted a modified replication of Tver-
sky and Kahneman's (1973, Experiment 3) letter ex-
periment. In the control condition, participants received
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a blank sheet ofpaper and were asked to first write down
10 words that have t as the third letter and subsequently
10 words that begin with the letter t. Following this
listing task, they rated the extent to which words begin-
ning with a t are more or less frequent than words that
have t as the third letter. As in Tversky and Kahneman's
(1973) study, participants estimated that words that
begin with a t are much more frequent than words
having a t in the third position. To isolate the role of
experienced ease, the diagnosticity of the experience
was manipulated in two experimental conditions. Spe-
cifically, participants had to record 10 words that begin
with a t on a sheet of paper that was imprinted with pale
but visible rows of ts. Some participants were told that
this background would make it easy to recall t words
(the facilitating condition), whereas others were told
that this background would interfere with the recall task
(the inhibiting condition). As expected, participants
who could attribute the experienced ease of recall to the
impact of their work sheet assumed that there are fewer
t words than did participants in the control condition.
Conversely, participants who expected their work sheet
to interfere with recall, but found recall easy neverthe-
less, estimated that there are more t words than did
participants in the control condition. In combination,
these discounting and augmentation effects indicate
that participants did indeed base their frequency esti-
mates on the implications of their subjective experience
ofease of recall rather than on the number ofwords they
could bring to mind.
The Diagnosticity of Accessibility
Experiences: Judgments of One's Own
Memory
In a similar vein, Winkielman, Schwarz, and Belli
(1998; see also Belli, Winkielman, Read, Schwarz, &
Lynn, in press) observed that judgments of how much
one can remember about one's own childhood are based
on the ease with which childhood memories can be
brought to mind. Depending on conditions, participants
had to recall either 4 (an easy task) or 12 (a difficult
task) childhood events and were subsequently asked,
"Are there large parts of your childhood after age 5
which you can't.remember?" (yes, unsure, and no; a
question taken from Ross, 1989). Whereas 46% of the
participants who had to recall 12 memories inferred that
they could not remember large parts of their childhood,
only 19% of the participants who had to recall 4 events
did so. Thus, the former participants inferred poorer
memory than the latter, despite the fact that they had
just recalled three times as many events. Presumably,
they based theirjudgment on the difficulty they encoun-
tered rather than on the number of events recalled.
Supporting this interpretation, informing participants in
another condition that recalling 12 childhood events is
a difficult task reduced reports of poor childhood mem-
ory to 27%, an estimate that does not reliably differ from
the four-events condition. Under this condition, they
(correctly) attributed the experienced difficulty to the
nature of the task rather than to the poor quality of their
childhood memory, thus eliminating the otherwise ob-
served impact.'
Similar (mis)attribution effects have been obtained
in other domains, to be addressed subsequently
(Schwarz, Bless, et al., 1991, Experiment 3). In combi-
nation, the Wanke et al. (1995) and Winkielman et al.
(1998) findings demonstrate that accessibility experi-
ences serve as a source of information in their own right,
much as has been observed for other types of experien-
tial information (see Clore, 1992; Schwarz & Clore,
1996; Strack, 1992).
Facial Feedback as an Indicator of
Recall Difficulty
If accessibility experiences constitute a distinct
source of information, any variable that leads people to
experience a given recall task as easy or difficult should
have the same effect as actual ease or difficulty of recall,
even when the experience is induced by an unrelated
variable. A study by Stepper and Strack (1993, Experi-
ment 2) supported this implication. These authors asked
all participants to recall six examples of assertive or
unassertive behavior, thus holding actual recall de-
mands constant. To manipulate the subjective recall
experiences, they induced participants to contract either
their corrugator muscle or their zygomaticus muscle
during the recall task. Contraction of the corrugator
muscle produces a furrowed brow, an expression com-
monly associated with a feeling of effort. Contraction
of the zygomaticus muscle produces a light smile, an
expression commonly associated with a feeling of ease.
Reflecting the impact of this proprioceptive feed-
back, participants who recalled six examples of asser-
tive behavior while adopting a light smile judged them-
selves as more assertive than participants who adopted
a furrowed brow. Conversely, participants who recalled
six examples of unassertive behavior while adopting a
light smile judged themselves as less assertive than
participants who adopted a furrowed brow. Apparently,
the experience of difficulty conveyed by a furrowed
brow led participants to conclude that they could not be
that assertive (or unassertive) if it was so difficult to
Note also that these findings suggest that attempts to recall large
amounts of childhood information are likely to result in inferences of
poor childhood memory, even when recall is successful. This obser-
vation bears in important ways on procedures designed to recover
childhood memories, which figure prominently in current discussions
of childhood amnesia as a function of childhood abuse (see Belli et
al., in press, for a discussion).
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bring assertive (or unassertive, respectively) behaviors
to mind.
Conclusions
In combination, these studies demonstrate that sub-
jective accessibility experiences constitute a source of
information that is distinct from the content that has
been brought to mind. In the previously mentioned
studies, the actual recall task and the amount of infor-
mation brought to mind was held constant. Neverthe-
less, participants arrived at differentjudgments depend-
ing on the subjective recall experience conveyed by
proprioceptive feedback (Stepper & Strack, 1993).
Moreover, the impact of experienced ease or difficulty
of recall depended on its perceived diagnosticity
(Wanke et al., 1995; Winkielman et al., 1998). Finally,
where accessible content and accessibility experiences
suggested different conclusions, participants relied on
the experiential information and inferred poorer mem-
ory after recalling 12 rather than 4 childhood events,
unless they were led to attribute the experienced diffi-
culty of recall to the nature of the task (Winkielman et
al., 1998).
Based on these findings, we may conclude that the
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973)
does indeed describe a metacognitivejudgment strategy
that is based on a monitoring of one's own recall
experiences, with close attention to their apparent diag-
nosticity. Accordingly, judgments of frequency, likeli-
hood, and typicality are often based on the ease with
which relevant material can be brought to mind, al-
though this is not the only strategy available to individu-
als.
Differential Implications of Accessible
Content and Accessibility Experiences
As noted previously, the conditions under which a
recall task is experienced as easy are often conditions
under which we are also likely to recall a large number
of instances. Under these conditions, reliance on acces-
sible content leads to the same conclusions as reliance
on accessibility experiences. It is possible, however, to
create conditions under which reliance on these differ-
ent sources of information leads to different judgments.
Suppose that some individuals are asked to recall 6
examples of situations in which they behaved asser-
tively, whereas others are asked to recall 12 examples.
Suppose further that recalling 6 examples is experi-
enced as easy, whereas recalling 12 examples is expe-
rienced as difficult. In this case, ajudgment strategy that
is based on recalled content would lead individuals to
infer higher assertiveness when the recall task brought
12 rather than 6 examples to mind, as shown in the top
panel of Figure 1. In contrast, a strategy based on
experienced ease or difficulty of recall would reverse
this pattern, as shown in the bottom panel of Figure 1:
Finding it difficult to recall 12 examples of assertive
behaviors, individuals may conclude that they cannot
be that assertive after all--or else bringing 12 examples
to mind would not be that difficult. Several studies bear
on this differential impact of accessible content and
accessibility experiences, which was also reflected in




In an initial test of this possibility, Schwarz, Bless,
et al. (1991, Experiment 1) asked participants to report
either 6 or 12 situations in which they behaved either
assertively or unassertively. Although all participants
could complete this task, pretests had shown that recall-
ing 6 examples was experienced as easy, whereas re-
calling 12 examples was experienced as difficult. Fol-
lowing their reports, participants had to evaluate their
own assertiveness. Table 1 shows the results.
As expected, participants reported higher assertive-
ness after recalling 6 examples of assertive behaviors
than after recalling 6 examples of unassertive behav-
iors. However, this difference did not increase as par-
ticipants had to recall more examples. To the contrary,
participants who had to recall assertive behaviors re-
ported lower assertiveness after recalling 12 rather than
6 examples. Similarly, participants who had to recall
unassertive behaviors reported higher assertiveness af-
ter recalling 12 rather than 6 examples. In fact, they
reported higher assertiveness after recalling 12 unasser-
tive rather than 12 assertive behaviors, in contrast to
what one would expect on the basis of recalled content.
Apparently, the experience that it was difficult to bring
12 examples to mind suggested to them that they could
not be that assertive (or unassertive) after all, resulting
Table 1. Self-Reports of Assertiveness as a Function of
Valence and Number ofRecalled Behaviors
Type of Behavior
Number of
Recalled Examples Assertive Unassertive
Six 6.3 5.2
Twelve 5.2 6.2
Note: N is 9 or 10 per condition. Mean score of three questions is
given; possible range is I to 1O, with higher values reflecting higher
assertiveness. From "Ease of retrieval as information: Another look
at the availability heuristic," by N. Schwarz, H. Bless, et al., 1991,
Journal ofPersonality and Social Psychology, 61, p. 197. Copyright
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Figure 1. Predicted judgments of assertiveness. Top panel: Judgments
formed on the basis of content of recall. Bottom panel: Judgments formed on
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in inferences opposite to the implications of recalled
content.
However, a possible alternative explanation de-
serves attention. Although all participants who were
asked to do so did in fact report 12 examples, it is
conceivable that the quality of their examples changed
over the course of the recall task: They may have been
able to recall some examples of clearly assertive behav-
ior early on, but as the requested number increased, they
had to include less and less convincing examples of
assertiveness. If so, these less convincing examples,
reported toward the end of the list, may have been more
accessible later on than the examples reported earlier.
Hence, if participants based their judgments on the last
few examples generated, one would obtain the same
pattern of results. Schwarz, Bless, et al. (1991, Experi-
ment 1) tested this possibility by analyzing the exam-
ples that participants reported. This content analysis
provided no evidence that the extremity of the examples
decreased toward the end. If anything, the last 2 exam-
ples reported were somewhat more extreme than the
first 2 examples reported. Thus, this alternative expla-
nation can be discarded.
Undermining the Diagnosticity of
Accessibility Experiences
To provide more direct evidence for the assumed
role of accessibility experiences, Schwarz, Bless, et al.
(1991, Experiment 3) manipulated the perceived infor-
mational value of the experienced ease or difficulty of
recall. To accomplish this, they had participants listen
to New Age music played at half-speed while they
worked on the recall task. Participants were told that
this music would facilitate the recall of a certain kind
of autobiographical memories, namely, either memo-
ries of situations in which one behaved assertively and
felt at ease or situations in which one behaved unasser-
tively and felt insecure. This manipulation renders par-
ticipants' accessibility experiences uninformative un-
der conditions where these experiences could be due to
the alleged impact of the music. For example, finding
it easy to bring 6 examples of assertive behavior to mind
is not very informative with regard to one's own asser-
tiveness when the experienced ease of recall may actu-
ally be due to the music. Similarly, finding it difficult
to recall 12 examples of assertive behavior is also not
informative when the music allegedly facilitates the
recall of the opposite behavior, which may interfere
with one's recall efforts. On the other hand, partici-
pants' accessibility experiences are rendered particu-
larly diagnostic when they contradict the alleged side
effects of the music. Thus, when the music is said to
make the recall of assertive behaviors easy, finding it
difficult to recall 12 assertive behaviors should provide
food for thought. As in the Wanke et al. (1995) study
reviewed previously, participants should rely on their
accessibility experiences only when their informational
value is not called into question. If these experiences
may be due to the alleged impact ofthe music, however,
participants may disregard their subjective experiences
and may rely on recalled content instead.
The findings supported these predictions. When the
informational value ofparticipants' experienced ease or
difficulty of recall was not called into question, the
previously obtained results replicated. Thus, partici-
pants evaluated themselves as less assertive after recall-
ing 12 rather than 6 examples of assertive behavior and
as more assertive after recalling 12 rather than 6 exam-
ples of unassertive behavior. Not so, however, when the
informational value of their accessibility experiences
was called into question. In this case, participants re-
ported higher assertiveness after recalling 12 rather than
6 examples of assertive behavior and lower assertive-
ness after recalling 12 rather than 6 examples of unas-
sertive behavior. In other words, their judgments re-
flected the content of the examples they recalled, and
the more so, the more examples were brought to mind.
Perceived Expertise and the Informational
Value of Recall Experiences
In the preceding studies, the informational value of
recall experiences was manipulated by drawing partici-
pants' attention to an external source that allegedly
facilitated or inhibited recall. The same logic, however,
applies to an individual difference variable, namely,
one's perceived expertise in the respective content do-
main. Suppose you are asked to list 12 famous Spanish
matadors and you find this task difficult. Chances are
that you would not conclude that there are not many
famous Spanish matadors-instead, you would blame
your own lack of expertise for the experienced diffi-
culty, thus undermining its informational value. As this
example illustrates, individuals may rely on recall ex-
periences only when they consider themselves at least
moderately knowledgeable in the relevant content do-
main. Experimental data support this conclusion.
For example, Biller, Bless, and Schwarz (1992) had
participants recall either three (easy) or nine (difficult)
examples of chronic diseases and subsequently asked
them to estimate the percentage of the population who
suffer from chronic diseases. As expected, they esti-
mated the prevalence of chronic diseases to be higher
after recalling three (M = 38.3%) rather than nine (M =
25.2%) examples, indicating that they based theirjudg-
ments on their accessibility experiences. To test the role
of perceived expertise, other participants were first
asked to indicate how much they knew about chronic
diseases, thus drawing their attention to their general
lack of knowledge in this domain. In this case, partici-
pants estimated the prevalence of chronic diseases to be
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lower after recalling three (M = 23.1 %) rather than nine
(M = 33.0%) examples, indicating that they based their
judgments on the number of examples recalled.
These findings suggest that people will rely on their
subjective recall experiences only when they consider
themselves knowledgeable but will turn to recalled
content when they do not (see also Schwarz & Schu-
man, 1997). Extending this line of research, Vaughn
(1997) explored the role of a particular kind of exper-
tise, namely, schematicity with regard to a personality
trait (Markus, 1977). Specifically, Markus asked asser-
tiveness schematics (who are considered experts on this
trait) and aschematics (nonexperts) to recall either three
or eight examples of their own assertive behavior. As
expected, assertiveness schematics based their self-as-
sessments on their subjective recall experience and
reported higher assertiveness after recalling three (easy)
rather than eight (difficult) examples. Conversely, as-
sertiveness aschematics discounted their subjective ac-
cessibility experience and based their self-assessments
on recalled information, reporting higher assertiveness
after recalling eight rather than three examples.
In combination, these studies indicate that perceived
knowledgeability is a crucial prerequisite for reliance
on experienced ease or difficulty of recall as a source
of information. When people are aware, or are made
aware, of a lack ofknowledge in the respective domain,
the diagnostic value of accessibility experiences is
called into question, much as is the case when their
attention is drawn to external factors likely to influence
their recall experience.
Depriving Judges of Experiential
Information
Similar conclusions are suggested by a study in
which judges did or did not have access to experiential
information. Specifically, Wanke, Bless, and Biller
(1996) asked participants to generate either three or
seven reasons for using or not using public transporta-
tion. Replicating previous findings, participants re-
ported more favorable attitudes toward public transpor-
tation after they generated three (easy) rather than seven
(difficult) proarguments or seven (difficult) rather than
three (easy) antiarguments (see Haddock, Rothman &
Schwarz, 1996). Thus, participants who had access to
relevant content as well as accessibility experiences
relied on their experiences in arriving at a judgment. A
group of yoked participants, however, were not asked
to generate reasons but read the reasons generated by
other participants, thus depriving them of the experien-
tial information available to the participants who gen-
erated the arguments. As may be expected, these par-
ticipants drew on the content of the arguments as the
only source of information available to them and re-
ported more favorable attitudes toward public transpor-
tation after reading seven rather than three proargu-
ments and more negative attitudes after reading seven
rather than three antiarguments.
As this example illustrates, the recipients of a com-
municator's arguments may arrive at the opposite con-
clusions as the communicator himself or herself.
Whereas the recipient can only draw on the implications
of the communicated arguments, the communicator
may qualify these implications by considering how easy
or difficult it was to generate the arguments in the first
place.
Conclusions
The reviewed studies demonstrate that recall tasks
render two distinct sources of information available: the
recalled content and the ease or difficulty with which it
can be brought to mind. Depending on which source
judges draw on, they may arrive at opposite conclu-
sions. Hence, we cannot predict their judgments on the
basis of recalled content alone but need to take into
account whether the content was easy or difficult to
bring to mind and whether or not this subjective expe-
rience is deemed diagnostic. When the diagnosticity of
accessibility experiences is called into question, either
due to external factors or a perceived lack ofknowledge,
or when no experiential information is available, judges
turn to recalled content as the more informative source
of information. In many cases, however, both sources
of information may seem similarly diagnostic. What
determines which source of information will be pre-
ferred under these conditions? In the next section I
address this issue.
Accessibility Experiences Versus
Accessible Content: The Influence of
Processing Motivation
Consistent with the notion of an availability heuris-
tic, we may consider reliance on ease of recall a heuris-
tic strategy, suggesting that variables known to deter-
mine the degree of heuristic processing should
influence the extent to which individuals rely on this
source of information. As a large body of research in
social cognition demonstrated, individuals' judgment
strategies depend, ceteris paribus, on the motivation
they bring to the task. The more self-relevant and in-
volving the task is, the more likely they are to adopt a
systematic processing strategy, paying attention to the
specific implications of the information that comes to
mind. In contrast, heuristic processing strategies are
preferred for less relevant and less involving tasks (for
variations on this theme, see Brewer, 1988; Chaiken,
Liberman, & Eagly, 1989; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993;
Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo, 1986). If
94
ACCESSIBILITY
so, the self-relevance of the material addressed in the
recall task may determine whether individuals rely on
accessible content or accessibility experiences in form-
ing a judgment.
Assessing One's Vulnerability to
Heart Disease
To test this possibility, Rothman and Schwarz (in
press) asked male undergraduates to list either three or
eight behaviors that they personally engage in that may
either increase or decrease their risk of heart disease.
Pretests indicated that listing three behaviors was expe-
rienced as easy, whereas listing eight was experienced
as difficult. The personal relevance of the task was
assessed via a background characteristic, namely,
whether or not participants had a family history of heart
disease. Supposedly, assessing their own risk of heart
disease is a more relevant task for men whose family
history puts them at higher risk than for men without a
family history of heart disease. Hence, participants with
a family history of heart disease should be likely to
adopt a systematic processing strategy, paying attention
to the specific behaviors brought to mind by the recall
task. In contrast, participants without a family history
may rely on a heuristic strategy, drawing on the subjec-
tive experience of ease or difficulty of recall.
As shown in Table 2, the results supported these
predictions. The top half shows participants' self-re-
Table 2. Vulnerability to Heart Disease as a Function of

































Note: N is 8 to 12 per condition. Judgments of vulnerability and the
need to change current behavior were made on 9-point scales, with
higher values indicating greater vulnerability and need to change,
respectively. Adapted from "Constructing perceptions of
vulnerability: Personal relevance and the use of experimental
information in health judgments," by A. J. Rothman and N. Schwarz,
in press, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. Copyright C)
1998 by Sage Publications. Reprinted by Permission of Sage
Publications, Inc.
ported vulnerability to heart disease. As expected, men
with a family history of heart disease drew on the
relevant behavioral information they recalled. Hence,
they reported higher vulnerability after recalling eight
rather than three risk-increasing behaviors and lower
vulnerability after recalling eight rather than three risk-
decreasing behaviors. In contrast, men without a family
history of heart disease drew on their accessibility
experiences, resulting in the opposite pattern. They
reported lower vulnerability after recalling eight (diffi-
cult) rather than three (easy) risk-increasing behaviors
and higher vulnerability after recalling eight rather than
three risk-decreasing behaviors.
In addition, participants' perceived need for behav-
ior change paralleled their vulnerability judgments, as
shown in the bottom half of Table 2. Note that partici-
pants with a family history of heart disease reported the
highest need for behavior change after recalling eight
risk-increasing behaviors, whereas participants without
a family history reported the lowest need for behavior
change under this condition, again illustrating a reversal
in the judgmental outcome.
Assessing One's Vulnerability to
Sexual Assault
Supporting the robustness of these findings,
Grayson and Schwarz (1997) observed a parallel pat-
tern when women were asked to assess their vulnerabil-
ity to sexual assault. In their study, women had to recall
four or eight behaviors they personally engaged in that
may either increase or decrease their risk of sexual
assault. Some of these women assumed that sexual
assault only happens to women who "ask for it," thus
reducing the personal relevance ofthe recall task. These
women relied on ease of recall and inferred higher
vulnerability after recalling four rather than eight risk-
increasing behaviors or eight rather than four risk-de-
creasing behaviors. Other women assumed that sexual
assault may happen to any woman, thus increasing the
personal relevance of the recall task. These women
relied on content of recall and inferred lower vulner-
ability after recalling four rather than eight risk-increas-
ing behaviors or eight rather than four risk-decreasing
behaviors. Thus, women's beliefs about sexual assault
determined the judgment strategy used, as did a family
history of heart disease in Rothman and Schwarz's (in
press) study.
Conclusions
In combination, these findings again illustrate that
the same recall task renders two distinct sources of
information available: accessible content and accessi-
bility experiences. Depending on which source indi-
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viduals draw on, they arrive at opposite conclusions. In
fact, analyses of the Rothman and Schwarz (in press)
data, shown in Table 2, did not reveal a main effect of
the content of the recall task, nor did analyses of the
Grayson and Schwarz data. In neither study could one
predict the impact of thinking about risk-increasing or
risk-decreasing behaviors without knowing if individu-
als found it easy or difficult to bring the respective
behaviors to mind and which judgmental strategy they
were likely to use.
Note also that the observed impact of personal in-
volvement on individuals' processing strategy contra-
dicts the common assumption that reliance on the avail-
ability heuristic is independent of judges' motivation.
In several studies, researchers offered participants in-
centives for arriving at the correct answer, yet such
incentives rarely attenuated reliance on the availability
heuristic (see Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Payne, Bettman,
& Johnson, 1993). Unfortunately, these studies could
not observe a change in processing strategy, even if it
occurred. To see why, suppose that one presented par-
ticipants with a list of the names of 19 famous women
and 20 nonfamous men (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973).
Suppose further that some participants are offered an
incentive to arrive at the correct estimate of the propor-
tion of female names on the list, whereas others are not.
Without an incentive, individuals may rely on a heuris-
tic strategy, drawing on experienced ease of recall. This
would lead them to conclude that there were more
female than male names on the list. With a successful
incentive, however, they may be motivated to invest
more effort. If so, they may recall as many names as
they can and may count the number of female names in
the recalled sample. Unfortunately, this systematic
strategy would lead them to the same conclusion, be-
cause the famous female names would be overrepre-
sented in the recalled sample.
As this example illustrates, we can only distinguish
between heuristic and systematic strategies when we
introduce conditions under which both strategies lead
to different outcomes. When this is done, we are likely
to observe the expected impact of processing motiva-
tion, as the previously mentioned findings illustrate.
Anticipated Accessibility Experiences:
Is It Enough to Imagine the Task?
All of the research examples reviewed so far elicited
accessibility experiences by having participants engage
in an easy or a difficult recall task. However, Tversky
and Kahneman (1973) suggested that "it is not neces-
sary to perform the actual operations of retrieval.... It
suffices to assess the ease with which these operations
could be performed" (p. 208, italics added). To address
this possibility, Wanke, Bohner, and Jurkowitsch (in
press) exposed participants to different advertisements
for luxury cars. Depending on conditions, the ad read,
"There are many reasons to choose a BMW. Can you
name one (ten, respectively)?" As predicted, partici-
pants reported more favorable attitudes toward BMW
cars when the ad prompted them to name only 1 reason
rather than to name 10 reasons. This difference was
obtained even though only 49% of the participants in
the 1-reason condition and 30% of the participants in
the 10-reasons condition reported that they attempted
to generate any reasons. Moreover, the obtained pat-
terns did not differ as a function of whether or not
participants actually attempted to generate any reasons,
suggesting that anticipated accessibility experiences are
just as informative as actually experienced ones.
Theoretical Implications
The reviewed research highlights the role of acces-
sible content and accessibility experiences in judgment
and circumscribes the conditions under which individu-
als are likely to make use of these distinct sources of
information. In this final section I summarize the impli-
cations for the operation of the accessibility heuristic
and the emergence of knowledge accessibility effects
in social judgment and I identify avenues for future
research.
Availability Heuristic
Judgments of frequency and likelihood can be based
on either recalled content or on the ease or difficulty
with which this content can be brought to mind. In most
situations, these two sources of information are natu-
rally confounded, a problem that rendered many of the
classic tests of the availability heuristic nondiagnostic.
When this confound is disentangled, the available evi-
dence supports the original formulation ofthe availabil-
ity heuristic as a metacognitive judgment strategy: In-
dividuals estimate the frequency of an event, the
likelihood of its occurrence, and its typicality "by the
ease with which instances or associations come to
mind" (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p. 208). However,
this strategy is not always employed.
First, individuals only rely on accessibility experi-
ences as a source of information when their informa-
tional value is not called into question. When they
attribute their experiences to an external influence (e.g.,
Rothman & Hardin, 1997; Schwarz, Bless, et al., 1991;
Wanke et al., 1995) or are aware that they may not be
knowledgeable about the content domain (e.g., Biller et
al., 1992; Vaughn, 1997), the otherwise observed im-
pact of accessibility experiences is eliminated. This
parallels the use of other sources of experiential infor-
mation, such as moods, emotions, or bodily states (see
Schwarz & Clore, 1996).
Second, when accessibility experiences are consid-
ered nondiagnostic, individuals turn to the content of
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recall as an alternate source of information (e.g.,
Schwarz, Bless, et al., 1991). Under unconstrained con-
ditions, reliance on recalled content is likely to lead to
the same outcome as reliance on ease of recall because
recall is experienced as easy when a large number of
examples can be brought to mind. When people are
induced to recall a few versus many examples, however,
these two sources of information have opposite impli-
cations: Whereas the experienced ease (or difficulty)
suggests that there are many (few) examples, the actual
examples recalled lead to the opposite conclusion.
Finally, individuals are likely to rely on accessibility
experiences when the judgment task is of low personal
relevance but draw on recalled content when the task is
of high personal relevance (e.g., Grayson & Schwarz,
1997; Rothman & Schwarz, in press). This influence of
processing motivation is consistent with dual-process
models ofjudgment (e.g., Brewer, 1988; Chaiken et al.,
1989; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Petty & Cacioppo,
1986). However, it could not be observed in previous
studies, which confounded ease and content of recall.
Accordingly, incentives may very well attenuate reli-
ance on the availability heuristic, in contrast to previous
conclusions (e.g., Nisbett & Ross, 1980). This possibil-
ity awaits empirical testing.
Knowledge Accessibility Effects
In addition, the reviewed research bears on knowl-
edge accessibility effects in social judgment (see Hig-
gins, 1996). Specifically, it suggests an intricate inter-
play of accessible content and accessibility experiences
that is not captured by common assumptions in social
cognition research.
First, one of the truisms of social cognition research
holds thatjudgments of a known target are based on the
declarative information that is most accessible in mem-
ory at the time ofjudgment. Yet, the reviewed findings
indicate that this is only the case when the respective
information is easy to bring to mind. When recall is
experienced as difficult, judges arrive at conclusions
that contradict the implications of what comes to mind.
They may infer, for example, that they are less assertive
after recalling 12 examples of assertive behavior than
after recalling 12 examples of unassertive behavior
(Schwarz, Bless, et al., 1991). Findings of this type
indicate that the implications of accessible content are
qualified by the subjective experiences that accompany
its recall. Hence, judgments reflect the semantic impli-
cations of accessible content when this content is easy
to bring to mind but reflect the opposite implications
when the same content is difficult to bring to mind.
Second, although the data bearing directly on this
conclusion are limited to memory-based judgments of
known targets, such as the self, similar qualifications
may apply to the interpretation of newly acquired infor-
mation. In general, it is assumed that new information
is interpreted in terms of the applicable concept that is
most accessible at the time of encoding, leading partici-
pants in the Higgins et al. (1977) study to conclude, for
example, that Donald is either stubborn or persistent,
depending on which concept was primed. Again, it is
conceivable that the ease with which the primed concept
comes to mind contributes to the impression that it
provides a good description of the target. In fact, when
participants are aware that the concept may come to
mind due to the potential influence of the priming
episode, they are unlikely to apply it in characterizing
the target (e.g., Lombardi, Higgins, & Bargh, 1987;
Martin, 1986; Strack, Schwarz, Bless, Kubler, &
Wanke, 1993). Although this observation parallels the
finding that accessibility experiences are not used when
alleged external influences undermine their informa-
tional value (e.g., Schwarz, Bless, et al., 1991), aware-
ness of the priming episode may affect judgments for a
number of different reasons (see Martin & Achee, 1992;
Strack, 1992). Accordingly, more targeted research will
be needed to isolate the role of accessibility experiences
in the interpretation of new information.
Finally, the reviewed findings indicate that the use
of accessible content or accessibility experiences de-
pends on individuals' processing strategy, which is
itself a function of their motivation and ability at the
time of judgment (e.g., Chaiken et al., 1989; Petty &
Cacioppo, 1986). As a result, knowing what comes to
mind, or knowing how easily it comes to mind, is not
sufficient to predict the judgmental outcome. Instead,
we also need to take individuals' processing motivation
into account: Individuals who rely on a systematic
processing strategy are likely to draw on accessible
content, whereas individuals who rely on a heuristic
processing strategy are likely to draw on subjective
accessibility experiences, resulting in opposite conclu-
sions despite having engaged in the same task (Grayson
& Schwarz, 1997; Rothman & Schwarz, in press).
As these complexities illustrate, knowledge accessi-
bility effects are not well captured by the popular as-
sumption that judgments depend on what happens to
come to mind at the time. Instead, we need to consider
the accessible content as well as the subjective experi-
ences that accompany it and need to pay attention to
individuals' processing motivation, which determines
which of these distinct sources of information they are
likely to draw on.
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